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previously unexplored dimensions of gender differences and discuss their bearings on labor market 
outcomes. Experiments have offered new findings on gender discrimination, and while they have 
identified a bias against hiring women in some labor market segments, the discrimination detected in 
field experiments is less pervasive than that implied by the regression approach. Experiments have 
also offered new insights into gender differences in preferences: to gain less from negotiation, women 
appear to have lower preferences than men for risk and competition and may be more sensitive to 
social cues. These gender differences in preferences also have implications in group settings, whereby 
the gender composition of a group affects team decisions and performance. Most of the evidence on 
gender traits comes from the lab, and key open questions remain as to the source of gender 
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1. Introduction
Women have made major inroads in labor markets throughout the past century, resulting in 
clear convergence in human capital investment and employment prospects and outcomes 
relative to men (Goldin, 2006). However, while the gender gap in schooling has closed—and 
even reversed—in most rich countries, there are remaining gender differences in pay and 
employment levels, as well as in the types of activities that men and women perform in the 
labor market (OECD, 2002). Women’s progress in the labor market has also led to major 
advances in labor economics, reflecting women’s changing role in the economy and 
identifying the factors behind the remaining disparities with respect to men. The development 
of novel empirical methods to identify gender differences has been accompanied by 
broadening perspectives on the gender dimensions of interest.  
This paper reviews recent advances in the economics of gender that have been achieved 
via the experimental approach. We discuss how the experimental literature contributes to a 
deeper understanding of recurrent questions on gender, as well as to the broadening of 
research questions towards previously unexplored dimensions of gender differences, and we 
examine their bearings on labor-market outcomes.2  
The factors driving gender differences in the labor market can be broadly categorized into 
three forces, which might be interconnected: productivity, preferences and discrimination. By 
the end of the 1990s, the state-of-the-art work on gender inequalities, summarized in Altonji 
and Blank’s (1999) chapter in the Handbook of Labor Economics, had focused mainly on 
productivity differences related to human-capital accumulation and discrimination as the 
main sources of gender gaps in wages and hours. At the same time, Altonji and Blank (1999) 
also indicated that a lack of direct evidence on discrimination and gender preferences was a 
key obstacle to cleanly differentiating among the effects of these three forces. Progress in 
these areas was hindered by the presence of unmeasured, confounding factors in the study of 
gender discrimination; and the difficulty of extracting clean information on psychological 
traits from naturally-occurring data in the study of gender preferences. By providing data 
explicitly suited to addressing the questions of interest, and allowing tight control on the 
environment, the experimental approach provides a valuable source of evidence on these and 
other gender issues.  
The experimental approach, both in the field and the lab, represents the most recent 
addition to the labor economist’s toolkit, in the quest for identification of causal effects of 
interests. As a clear indication of this trend, two chapters in the latest Handbook volume are 
devoted entirely to discussing lessons drawn from experiments in labor economics (List and 
Rasul, 2011; Charness and Kuhn, 2011). Various factors have contributed to the increased 
use of experiments in labor research. First, the growing influence of the behavioral literature 
on economic research has expanded labor economists’ perspectives to largely unexplored 
fields at the border between economics and psychology (see Bertrand, 2011, for a recent 
2 A number of recent papers survey these literatures extensively. Bertrand (2011) discusses new advances in the 
gender literature, based on both experimental and non-experimental evidence, with an emphasis on gender 
differences in preferences, gender identity, and women’s well-being. Croson and Gneezy (2009) cover lab 
experiments on gender preferences in detail. The growing usage of field and lab experiments in labor economics 
is discussed by List and Rasul (2011) and Charness and Kuhn (2011), respectively. 
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survey on new perspectives on gender disparities). Second, labor economists have become 
more clearly aware of the limitations of observational data in answering old and new 
questions and have at the same time set higher standards for empirical inference. Finally, 
economists have become increasingly able and willing to engage in the collection of original 
data. Given these advances, the experimental approach has made available new data on 
traditional labor questions and enabled labor economists to address new questions by “letting 
questions determine the data to be obtained, instead of the data determining the questions that 
can be asked” (Duflo, 2006). 
Experiments in economics have evolved in a number of directions, and, to organize our 
discussion, it is helpful to classify empirical strategies in labor economics according to the 
degree of control allowed to the researcher. At one end of the spectrum, there are the 
traditionally used, naturally-occurring data, over which the researcher has no control—over 
the information elicited or the economic environment—and for which identifying 
assumptions are needed to estimate the causal effect of treatment. At the other end of the 
spectrum, there are laboratory experiments, which use randomization to identify the effect of 
treatment in the lab (most typically on a subject pool of students) and which allow the 
researcher to fully control the environment. Thanks to randomization, the causal effect of 
treatment is identified simply by the difference in mean treatment and control outcomes. 
Somewhere between these two extremes are (various typologies of) field experiments, which 
use randomization in a natural-occurring environment—typically on relevant sample pools 
that may not be aware of their participation in an experiment—and thus allow for a 
combination of control and realism (Harrison and List, 2004).   
In recent decades, the empirical literature on gender has progressed along this conceptual 
spectrum. Economists have long been interested in the causes and consequences of gender 
discrimination in the marketplace. Early work on discrimination extensively used the 
regression approach and decomposition techniques on observational data. However, the 
increased awareness of this approach’s limitations has gradually shifted the emphasis of 
empirical work on this topic towards field experiments such as audit and correspondence 
studies, which aim to compare outcomes in the same job for two individuals who are identical 
in all respects other than gender. While experiments have been used more extensively to 
study race, rather than gender, discrimination, the experimental approach has in some cases 
provided clean evidence on gender discrimination in hiring, and represents a promising path 
for future research. We discuss findings from this approach in Section 2.  
More recently, growing emphasis on potential differences in psychological attributes 
between men and women has shifted the attention of experimental work towards the study of 
various dimensions of gender preferences, including preferences towards risk, competition, 
negotiation and other-regarding preferences (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for an exhaustive 
review of the experimental work on gender preferences). Potential differences in preferences 
and psychological attributes might offer additional insight into gender gaps in participation to 
the labor market, in the types of jobs held, and in the performance in a given job. Information 
on gender preferences is typically elicited in a lab environment, which best isolates one factor 
of decision, say the attitude towards risk. The recent literature contains numerous examples 
from this approach, and is discussed in Section 3.  
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Finally, the emphasis on gender differences at an individual level has led to a recent 
interest in the role of these differences in collective settings. Higher female representation in 
high-profile jobs in politics and the corporate sector—partly prompted by regulation such as 
the introduction of gender quotas in several countries—has led academics and policymakers 
alike to question the consequences of teams’ gender composition for collective decision 
making. Section 4 links recent empirical evidence from the field and the lab to team work and 
discusses evidence on the impact of the gender composition of teams on decision making and 
firm performance. 
Section 5 concludes this survey by summarizing the state of the art and discussing current 
open issues and directions for future research.  
 
2. Discrimination 
The study of discrimination, encompassing concepts, measurement and impact, has featured 
prominently in the gender literature since Becker’s (1957) seminal work. 3  Gender 
discrimination in the labor market is defined as a situation in which equally productive men 
and women are rewarded differently, making it necessary to correctly measure differences in 
productivity in order to pin down the discrimination residual. The early literature has used 
regression-based methods on observational data—typically labor force or household survey 
data—to test for discrimination in the labor market. The most common approach (Oaxaca, 
1973; Blinder, 1973) consists in decomposing wage (or participation) differentials between 
men and women into an ‘explained’ gap, driven by gender differences in observable worker 
and, sometimes, job characteristics; and an ‘unexplained’ gap, driven by different returns to 
given characteristics that are in turn associated with discrimination. Results from this 
literature are summarized by Altonji and Blank (1999), and point to large unexplained gaps in 
gender wages and participation rates. 
While the existence of an unexplained gap in wages is certainly consistent with 
discrimination, this measure suffers from two main drawbacks. First, most observational data 
inevitably lack information on some of the determinants of a worker’s productivity, which are 
nevertheless observed and valued by employers. Thus the unexplained gap is contaminated 
by unobserved differences in productivity, and whether it provides an upward or downward 
bias of the true extent of discrimination depends on the sign of differences in such 
unobservables. 4  Second, if pre-labor market investment in human capital is affected by 
expectations of future discrimination, part of the impact of discrimination is captured by 
observable productivity differences, and the resulting unexplained gap would underestimate 
the true extent of discrimination. In the first case, the regression approach would control for 
‘too little,’ while in the second case, it would control for ‘too much.’ 
Experiments are a natural response to some of the weaknesses inherent in the regression 
approach to discrimination on conventional survey data. As “discrimination is a causal effect 
defined by a hypothetical ceteris paribus conceptual experiment” (Heckman, 1998), the 
experimental approach allows researchers to approximate the ceteris paribus condition by 
3 See Altonji and Blank (1999, Sections 3 and 4) and references therein. 
4 For this purpose, employer-employee matched data provide an improvement over survey data, as they allow 
researchers to better extract information on productivity of individuals, see Hellerstein and Neumark (2006). 
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comparing outcomes for otherwise identical men and women on identical jobs, thus removing 
sources of correlation between gender and other determinants of outcomes of interest. Clearly, 
this approach addresses the issue of confounding unobservables in survey data estimates, but 
it would be unable to address pre-labor market discrimination.  
The experimental approach in gender discrimination has exploited various forms of audit 
or correspondence studies to detect discrimination in hiring. 5  Audit studies on gender 
compare callback rates and/or offer rates on a given job opening for pairs of applicants—one 
male and one female—with identical resumes, who are coached to act alike. Neumark (1996) 
conducts an audit study of hiring discrimination in the US restaurant industry. In his 
experiment, two male and two female college students are sent to apply for jobs as waiters 
and waitresses at 65 restaurants in Philadelphia, with a male and female pair applying for the 
same job at each restaurant. Male and female auditors were made to look identical on paper 
by creating resumes that were equivalent in terms of educational qualifications and previous 
work experience, and differences in personality and appearance were minimized. To this 
purpose, two auditors for each gender were employed in the study, instead of one, to help 
reduce the impact of traits that are unique to an individual participant, and all participants 
were instructed to act and dress alike throughout all contacts with the restaurants. 
Furthermore, while job offer rates are potentially contaminated by differences in personality 
and appearance, callback rates for job interviews are independent of these, as they are based 
solely on resumes.  
Results show that women are significantly less likely to be invited for interviews and to 
receive job offers from high-price restaurants. They are also more likely to receive job offers 
from low-price restaurants, but this effect is imprecisely estimated. While the estimates 
presented for the high end of the restaurant industry are clearly consistent with discrimination 
against women, the overall conclusions from this study should be considered with care 
because of the very small scale of the study and the fact that estimated specifications do not 
allow for error components that are specific to an applicant/category pair. Thus, if a certain 
applicant were perceived to be particularly suitable for a high-price restaurant, and this 
applicant happened to be male, this match-specific component would show up in the 
estimates as discrimination against women.6   
While audit studies provide cleaner evidence on discrimination than the typical regression 
approach on survey data, the attempt to submit pairs of otherwise identical men and women 
to an experiment may not be fully accomplished. Despite efforts to match auditors on as 
many characteristics as possible, there may be remaining differences that are valued by 
employers. More importantly, the fact that auditors are instructed about the purpose of the 
study may induce conscious or subconscious behavior that is correlated with gender. 
5 The discussion that follows refers to field experiments on discrimination. There is also a smaller literature on 
lab experiments on discrimination (see Anderson et al., 2006, for a survey), which we do not review here, as it 
has not specifically addressed the gender dimension. 
6 Results from earlier audit studies (Levinson, 1975; Firth, 1982; Riach and Rich, 1987) are reviewed by Riach 
and Rich (2002). A general conclusion from this body of work is that women are likely to encounter 
discrimination in higher-status jobs, but discrimination is not detected in many of the occupations considered. In 
particular, there is evidence of discrimination against men in female-dominated occupations (Levinson, 1975). 
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Such weaknesses can be overcome in “blind” studies à la Goldin and Rouse (2000). Their 
well-known study exploits the gradual adoption of blind auditioning by US orchestras during 
the 1970s and 1980s. This change in hiring practices was prompted by concerns that 
discrimination would limit the careers of female musicians, especially in the access to great 
symphony orchestras. In blind auditions, a sound-porous screen is used to hide the identity of 
the player from the jury, and the comparison of gender differences in hiring rates before and 
after the introduction of blind auditioning provides some of the cleanest evidence available of 
discrimination against women. Goldin and Rouse find that blind auditioning increases the 
probability that a woman is advanced from the preliminary selection round by 50 percent, and 
that it has an even greater effect on the probability that a woman is hired in the final round. 
Despite the fact that not all their results point in the same direction, the overall conclusion of 
the paper is that blind auditioning reduced discrimination against women and thus contributed 
to the recent increase in the presence of women in top orchestras.  
Although extremely powerful, blind studies are hard to find, not least because jobs in 
which prospective employers are able to extract a clear signal of a worker’s productivity 
while their gender is concealed (as it is the case for musicians’ positions) are very rare. In the 
absence of viable blind studies, correspondence studies have recently provided a promising 
alternative to audit studies. By sending resumes on fictitious applicants instead of real-life 
auditors, correspondence studies overcome the main weaknesses of the personal approach in 
audit studies (and are markedly cheaper). Their drawback is that, by construction, they can 
only identify discrimination in the access to job interviews, and cannot therefore provide any 
guidance as to discrimination at the job-offer stage. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) 
provide the largest and probably best-known correspondence study of racial discrimination, 
whereby race is signaled in resumes by white-sounding versus black-sounding names. 
Although gender differences are not the focus of their paper, Bertrand and Mullainathan 
detect no evidence of lower callback rates for females than for males.  
In the gender literature, the use of correspondence studies has been relatively limited. 
Riach and Rich (2006) conduct a mid-scale experiment of gender discrimination in hiring in 
the UK, sending pairs of fictitious applications to job postings in four occupations: 
accountants, computer programmers, engineers and secretaries. The first two are gender-
neutral occupations, while the last two are male-dominated and female-dominated, 
respectively. The resumes of men and women are carefully matched on qualifications 
(specific to each occupation). Results show statistically significant discrimination against 
women in the male-dominated occupations and against men in both the female-dominated 
occupation and the mixed occupations. 
Petit (2007) provides a correspondence study of gender discrimination in the French 
finance industry. In order to shed light on the role of family constraints in gender 
discrimination, Petit creates sets of resumes covering various types: young, single and 
childless; prime-age, single and childless; and prime-age with children. Discrimination 
against women is detected for young workers in high-skill advertisements, while among 
prime-age workers, data reveal no evidence of discrimination in either direction. 
Audit and correspondence studies are widely viewed as the most compelling avenue to 
test for discrimination. However, their use for labor market discrimination has been criticized 
on various grounds (see Heckman and Siegelman, 1993, and Heckman, 1998). As noted 
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above, by sending paper applications as opposed to real-life auditors, correspondence studies 
adequately address concerns of systematic gender differences in unobservables and in 
auditors’ behavior induced by coaching. However, both audit and correspondence studies 
suffer from a more fundamental criticism, and namely that the assumption of equal group-
averages of unobserved productivity is not informative of discrimination when the relevant 
treatment is not linear in productivity—as is the case in hiring, in which treatment is binary 
based on a productivity threshold. To give an intuitive example, imagine that men and 
women apply to a job for which they are well qualified, such that the majority of each group 
would pass the hiring threshold. In the absence of discrimination, men and women face the 
same hiring cutoff. Correspondence studies are meant to ensure that, in employers’ beliefs, 
the unobservable productivity component has equal gender mean, and infer discrimination 
from differences in call-back rates. But suppose for example that, while still imposing equal 
means, the distribution of unobservables for women is more dispersed than for men. In this 
case the share of women who pass the hiring cutoff is lower, simply because of the fatter left 
tail in their unobservables’ distribution. The resulting difference in callback rates would be 
interpreted as evidence of discrimination against women, but discrimination was excluded by 
the assumption of equal hiring thresholds.7 
Work by Neumark (2012) addresses the Heckman and Siegelman (1993) concern by 
establishing conditions that allow one to recover unbiased estimates of discrimination when 
group variances differ. His proposed method exploits variation in applicants’ observables and 
requires equal returns to observables across groups. In this case, returns to observables 
estimated from a correspondence study can be informative of the relative variance of 
unobservables, which is in turn used to obtain unbiased estimates of discrimination. Variation 
in observable determinants of productivity is rare to find in correspondence studies, as they 
typically create one “type” of applicant with certain qualifications and characteristics, and the 
only randomized characteristic is one that is not intended to have an impact on productivity, 
such as race or gender. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) present an exception to this 
tendency, by creating high-quality and low-quality resumes. By using their data, Neumark 
infers higher relative variance of unobservables for black-sounding applicants from the lower 
returns to a high-quality resume for black-sounding applicants than for white-sounding 
applicants. When the implied relative variance is used to adjust estimates of callback rates, 
the estimated effect of race is larger than in the unadjusted estimates, consistent with the low 
relative hiring threshold assumed in the study. While available experimental estimates of race 
discrimination seem robust to the main Heckman and Siegelman criticism, it should be 
stressed that existing audit or correspondence evidence on gender discrimination is scarce, 
less clear-cut, and still open to this criticism.  
Another drawback of both audit and correspondence studies is that they are intended to 
estimate the average level of discrimination—insofar as they are based on outcomes at 
randomly selected firms. As pointed out by Heckman (1998), the average level of 
discrimination is irrelevant for minorities’ outcomes in a competitive market, and the only 
feature that matters is the causal effect of gender at the marginal firm, or at the set of firms 
7 The opposite result—namely spurious discrimination against men—would be detected if men and women were 
under-qualified, such that the majority of them would not pass the hiring threshold. 
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where women or ethnic minorities end up applying or working. Discrimination at the average 
firm, as detected by some audit and correspondence studies, may thus be consistent with no 
discrimination at the margin. However, while in a frictionless, competitive labor market 
minority members can escape discrimination even if there is only a single non-discriminating 
employer, these conclusions would not hold in a market with frictions. With imperfect 
mobility, minority members are at a disadvantage as soon as any firm is willing to 
discriminate (see the discussion on this by Manning, 2003, pp. 215-216, and references 
therein). 
While it is not trivial to extrapolate a clear consensus view from the existing body of 
experimental literature on gender discrimination, it is fair to broadly summarize this literature, 
concluding that there is evidence of significant discrimination against women in high-status 
or male-dominated jobs and discrimination against men in female-dominated jobs. Compared 
to the regression approach, the experimental approach tends to find far more limited evidence 
of discrimination against women in the marketplace. Different results from the two 
approaches may be driven by systematic gaps in unobservables in favor of men, which would 
contaminate the unexplained gap in wages. 
Two questions still remain with respect to the existing experimental evidence on 
discrimination. The first question concerns the nature of the observed extent of discrimination. 
There exist two main economic models of gender discrimination, one in which employers 
derive disutility from employing women relative to men (‘taste-based’ discrimination) and 
one in which employers use gender to extrapolate a signal of unobserved components of 
productivity (‘statistical’ discrimination). Existing evidence on gender discrimination in the 
workplace is not suited to parsing its nature and typically expresses no claim to it. Progress in 
this direction might be made possible by enriching typical field experiment set-ups with 
tighter researcher control on elements directly linked to the nature of discrimination. These 
would include the manipulation of the information available to participants, which would be 
irrelevant in the case of taste-based discrimination but would instead be highly valued in case 
of statistical discrimination, and the use of specific games—e.g. the dictator game—that are 
meant to isolate tastes for discrimination. In this vein, List (2004) shows that the use of 
complementary framed experiments gives a clear indication of statistical, rather than taste-
based, discrimination in the market for sports cards, such that minorities (blacks, the elderly 
and women) receive lower offers than majorities mostly because dealers use minority 
membership as a signal for the distribution of reservation values. As framed experiments 
require tighter control on the environment structure, they tend to depart from real labor 
market scenarios that are the object of existing audit or correspondence studies, but the 
design of similar treatments in the workplace could advance the understanding of the nature 
of discrimination. 
The second question regards the mapping between the extent of discrimination revealed 
by field experiments (especially correspondence studies) and labor market outcomes of 
interest. Correspondence studies typically give an indication of gender differences in call-
back rates in various types of jobs. Their impact on wage and employment differences 
depends on potential gender outcomes at the job offer stage. In the hypothetical case in which 
gender differences in call-back rates are completely reversed at the job offer stage, one would 
observe no gender differences in outcomes such as hiring rates or wages. While this is indeed 
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an extreme scenario, inherent limits of correspondence studies require some care in their use 
for drawing inferences on employment and wage differentials. In the general case in which 
differences in call-back rates translate into significant differences in hiring rates, their impact 
on wage differentials in turn depends in turn on overall worker mobility. If workers receive 
outside offers very frequently, labor mobility will wash out the impact of differences in hiring 
rates if there are at least some non-discriminating employers. But as shown by Manning 
(2003, Chapter 4), substantial search frictions in the labor market translate differences in 
hiring rates into persistent differences in wages. 
 
3. Individual Preferences 
The traditional approach in labor economics to understanding gender differences in outcomes 
has discussed demand-side explanations such as discrimination, and supply-side explanations 
based on the accumulation of human capital and family constraints. More recently, however, 
economists have looked into alternative supply-side explanations for gender differences in 
outcomes that are related to psychological attributes and preferences. This tendency was 
partly motivated by the need to find alternative explanations for the residual gender gap in 
outcomes, and eased by the growing influence of the behavioral and psychological literatures 
in economics. 
A great deal of choice exists in factors that shape labor market outcomes. Individual 
preferences in the spheres of motivation, ambition and competitiveness—to mention a few—
drive choice, and, if they are systematically correlated to gender, they contribute to the 
observed gaps in outcomes. Measuring preferences on observational data is often difficult, if 
not impossible. Experiments offer a useful methodology that allows one to study behavior 
and strategic interaction in a controlled environment and, importantly, can be adapted to elicit 
gender differences in preferences in spheres potentially associated with labor market success.  
In this section we discuss experimental findings on gender differences in preferences that 
may affect job choice and on-the-job outcomes. Gender differences in preferences for risk 
and competition offer explanations for job sorting—the important first stage of a labor 
relation. Moreover, differences in bargaining behavior may shed light on within-job 
disparities in wages and career progression. More generally, differences in social preferences, 
potentially featuring at all career stages, could offer interesting insights into how men and 
women function in the workplace. The quest for evidence on gender differences in 
preferences, along with the ease of characterizing these preferences in simple lab experiments, 
has prompted a huge body of experimental work in a relatively short period (see Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009, for a detailed survey). Below we summarize some of the main findings from 
this literature, and discuss available evidence on the origin of gender differences in 
preferences and on their labor market consequences.  
Earning differences across occupations and industries have been widely documented in 
the literature. Occupational and industry segregation of men and women is one of the leading 
components of gender gaps in earnings (Altonji and Blank, 1999). As jobs in different sectors 
offer different arrays of job security, earnings stability and working conditions, systematic 
gender differences in preferences towards risk and competition have the potential to shape 
gaps in earnings through job sorting behavior. 
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Job-related risks (such as job-loss risk or earning volatility) are typically rewarded by 
higher mean earnings, and high-risk sectors tend to be male-dominated. If women are more 
risk-averse than men, they end up being overrepresented in jobs with lower-mean and lower-
variance salaries. In the lab, simple risk experiments using real and hypothetical gambles 
have been carried out to understand gender differences in risk preferences. The consistent 
finding from lab evidence is that men are more risk-prone than women (see surveys by Eckel 
and Grossman, 2008, and Croson and Gneezy, 2009). While some attribute these differences 
to the emotional reaction to uncertain situations (Lowenstein et al., 2001), others report that 
they are related to confidence (Soll and Klayman, 2004). Similar conclusions have been 
drawn from (scant) survey and field evidence (Dohmen et al., 2011; Dwyer et al., 2011). 
High-profile careers often develop in highly competitive settings, in which rewards are 
linked to relative, rather than absolute, performance. Using experiments that ask subjects to 
sort into environments with varying degrees of competition, we can observe whether there 
exist gender differences in participation in more competitive environments and, as a second 
stage, whether there are gender differences in performance in the more competitive 
environments. In the lab setting of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), subjects can choose 
between a piece-rate incentive scheme and a tournament (winner-takes-all) competition. 
Conditional on performance, women prefer to be compensated piece-rate, while men prefer 
tournaments. Moreover, by shying away from competition, the well-performing women hurt 
themselves financially. Other experimental evidence also suggests that men thrive in 
competitive environments. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) show that when subjects 
are compensated by either piece-rate or a winner-takes-all tournament, men perform slightly 
better than women under piece-rate but substantially better in a tournament setting. Males’ 
performance increases significantly in the competitive setting, while that of the female 
subjects remains constant. Evidence from a field experiment on school children by Gneezy 
and Rustichini (2004) broadly confirms lab findings, and also shows that the opponent’s 
gender matters for individual performance. Using short-distance running, they find that girls’ 
speed decreases when they run against other girls, while it slightly increases when they run 
against boys. Rewards at stake also seem to matter for competitive behavior. Antonovic et al. 
(2009) find that women perform worse against men than against other women when stakes 
are low, while they perform better when stakes are high. Finally, lab results show that men 
and women differ significantly in how they respond to wins and losses from past tournaments, 
as women’s performance is negatively affected by previous losses, while men’s performance 
is only negatively affected when stakes are sufficiently high (Gill and Prowse, 2014). 
Another hypothesis for why earnings of men and women differ, even on identical jobs, is 
that men and women bargain salary differently. In the psychology literature, it has been 
suggested that women earn less than their male counterparts because they avoid competitive 
negotiation and, as Babcock and Laschever (2003) point out, they simply “don’t ask” for a 
pay increase. In a lab setting, the experiment of Small et al. (2007) identifies a clear gender 
gap in the likelihood of initiating a negotiation, with women asking for a higher payment 
from the experimenter less often than men. Bowles et al. (2007) study gender differences in 
negotiation in the presence of an evaluator, who can be male or female. An important result 
in their study is that women are less likely to start a negotiation in the presence of a male 
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evaluator, and women who initiate negotiations receive systematically poorer evaluations by 
male evaluators than men.  
Ultimatum games are also suited to characterizing attitudes in negotiations, as they 
involve sharing a given amount between two parties via a single take-it-or-leave-it offer.8  
Eckel and Grossman (2001) and Solnick (2001) examine gender in ultimatum settings, and 
both find that men and women make similar offers. However, Eckel and Grossman (2001) 
find that women are generally less likely to reject offers, while Solnick (2001) concludes that 
women are more demanding than men when the opposer is female, and less demanding when 
the opposer is male. Recent work by Rigdon (2013) also finds that women make significantly 
lower demands than men. However, the gap in demands is mitigated when they are given 
information on demands made by others in similar negotiations, suggesting that simple pieces 
of information may shape women’s beliefs about the norms of negotiation and reduce earning 
gaps.   
Finally, there has been a great deal of interest in whether men and women exhibit 
different degrees of social preferences and, in particular, whether other-regarding attitudes 
such as altruism, fairness or envy may play a stronger role in female than in male decisions. 
Gender differences in social preferences might help us understand why men and women 
select into certain sectors or jobs; for example, women tend to be overrepresented in the 
social sector. Moreover, these differences may have an impact on gender outcomes in a given 
job, as individuals may take into account their social preferences when negotiating wages and 
collaborating with coworkers. Social preferences have been investigated in a number of game 
theoretic settings, including simple ultimatum and dictator games, as well as games that 
address trust, social dilemmas and public good provision.  
In the ultimatum game, the proposer maximizes her (selfish) payoff by offering the 
smallest amount, and the responder maximizes her own payoff by accepting any offer. When 
this does not happen, responding subjects have other-regarding preferences, such as altruism, 
fairness or (negative) reciprocity. No significant gender differences are detected at the offer 
stage (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001), and only in specific circumstances would 
women make smaller demands than men (Solnick, 2001; Rigdon, 2013).  
While the ultimatum game setting makes it is difficult to establish whether proposers 
make generous offers because they fear rejection or because they are altruistic, the dictator 
game overcomes this problem by giving the respondent no choice but to accept the proposer’s 
offer. Eckel and Grossman (1998), Bolton and Katok (1995) and Andreoni and Vesterlund 
(2001) find that women offer significantly more than men in a simple dictator game, while 
Bolton, Katok, and Zwick (1998) and Bohnet and Frey (1999) find no significant gender 
differences. Other studies, based on variations of the dictator game, conclude that women are 
more sensitive than men to equity considerations (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, section 3.2). 
Sociologists and economists have long believed that differences in trust or “social capital” 
explain a great deal about the successes and failures of individuals and societies in 
performance and progress. Insuring against distrust is costly and typically involves formal 
8 In the ultimatum game, one player, the “proposer,” makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer such that she divides some 
amount of money between herself and another person. The second person, the “responder,” can accept or reject 
the division. If the responder rejects, they both get nothing. 
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legal contracts  or informal pacts through, for example, family solidarity. In experimental 
economics, simple experiments have been used to elicit trust through the interaction of 
investors and trustees in trust games.9 Several studies find no gender differences in trust (see, 
among others, Croson and Buchan, 1999), but women’s trust is more sensitive than men’s to 
the details of the context. For example, in Eckel and Wilson (2004), some participants are 
shown a picture of their recipients, while others are given some information; women trust 
more than men when they have a photo of their counterpart, but less when they have only 
written information. 
Gender differences in social preferences may finally translate into differences in the 
willingness to contribute to public goods. Eckel and Grossman (2008) survey findings from 
public good experiments,10 and conclude that evidence on gender differences in the provision 
of public goods is mixed, as some studies find that women contribute more than men, while 
others find the opposite. Moreover, the comparability of available findings is complicated by 
variation in the specific experimental designs. In summary, simple dictator or ultimatum 
games suggest stronger altruistic preferences among women than men, but evidence from 
other settings is far from conclusive. 
While evidence from various experimental settings suggests that women and men may 
differ in traits that are potentially related to labor market success, the causes—nature or 
nurture— and the economic consequences of such differences are not entirely understood. 
Understanding nature and nurture components of gender differences in behavior is a key 
issue, with clear policy implications. On the nature side, obvious differences between men 
and women related to childbirth and physical strength, and more subtle differences related to 
brain structure and sex hormones, may have an impact on how well men and women fare in 
the labor market. Women’s physical traits are likely to have a declining impact on their labor 
market involvement, thanks to medical progress in contraception, child rearing, or maternal 
health (Goldin and Katz, 2002, Bailey, 2006, and Albanesi and Olivetti, 2009), as well as 
technological advances biased towards brain relative to brawn skills (Welch, 2000). 
Nevertheless, a few (non-experimental) studies have detected a significant correlation 
between exposure to sex hormones and gender behavior (see Dreber and Hoffman, 2007, for 
an application to risk preferences, and Bertrand, 2011, section 2.7.2, for a critical review of 
related work), and others have investigated the relationship between menstruation and 
absenteeism (Ichino and Moretti, 2011; Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012, 2013) 
On the nurture side, preferences may have roots in the education system, the household, 
or society at large. Recent experimental work has provided evidence of important 
environmental influences in various contexts. Gneezy et al. (2008) compare attitudes toward 
competition in patriarchal and matrilineal societies in a lab experiment setting. While men in 
the Maasai patriarchal society in Tanzania are significantly more likely to compete, the 
gender differential in competition is reversed in the matrilineal society of the Khasi in India. 
9 A simple trust game proposed by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) involves an “investor” and a “trustee.” 
The Investor is endowed with an amount of money, which she can keep or invest, with a given return rate. The 
trustee is entrusted with the investment and must decide how much of it to keep and how much to return. Trust 
is the willingness to gamble that another person will reciprocate a risky move, and is measured by the amount 
invested. Trustworthiness is measured by the amount returned. 
10 These are essentially n-players prisoner’s dilemma games. 
12 
 
                                                          
 
 
Symmetric gender gaps suggest that attitudes towards competition may not be driven by 
biological differences. Using similar lab techniques, Booth and Nolen (2012) study gender 
differences in risk preferences in single-sex and coeducational schools, and find that girls 
from single-sex schools have risk preferences similar to boys’, while girls in coed schools are 
more risk averse. In the same context, Booth and Nolen (2009) look at gender differences in 
the willingness to compete, and find that girls in single-sex schools have competitive 
preferences similar to boys’, while girls in mixed-gender schools choose piece-rate 
compensation more often than boys.  
Household influences may start at a young age through interaction with parents, or later 
in life through interaction with spouses. Evidence on these mechanisms is scant. Using 
school-level surveys, Fryer and Levitt (2010) find no evidence of differential parental 
investment in girls’ and boys’ math skills, but there is little direct evidence on later influences 
and in particular on the interplay between the spousal division of labor in the household and 
women’s performance in the labor market. Although not strictly a nurture mechanism, 
symmetric gender gaps in working hours in the household and the market point to a clear link 
between women’s role as main providers of home production and their labor choices and 
constraints. Findings from the (non-experimental) labor supply literature show a causal 
impact of fertility on female labor supply (see e.g. Angrist and Evans, 1998), and more 
specific evidence on the household division of labor would be welcome to give a richer 
picture of the labor market impact of women’s involvement in the household. 
The important next stage is to understand how findings from the lab on gender differences 
in preferences would map out on labor market outcomes. Typical lab settings such as abstract 
contexts and relatively low stakes naturally call for real-life validations of lab results. One 
topic that has received the most attention is that of competitive preferences. Buser, Niederle 
and Oosterbeck (2014) find that the lab measure of competitiveness introduced by Niederle 
and Vesterlund (2007), based on choice of tournament compensation, explains about a fifth 
of the gender gap in academic track choices in Dutch secondary schools. As the adopted 
measure of competitiveness is based, among other factors, on math ability, and the prestige of 
an academic track is based mainly on math content, part of the observed correlation between 
competitiveness and choice of prestigious tracks may in principle be driven by variation in 
math ability. However, the experiment collects independent information on both actual and 
perceived math ability, and the impact of these on the choice of prestigious tracks is not 
substantially altered when controlling for competitive preferences.  
Workplace consequences of competitive preferences have been recently addressed by 
Flory, Leibbrandt and List (2010), who explore job application decisions of men and women. 
In their field experiment, interested job seekers are randomized into compensation regimes 
with varying incidence of relative performance evaluation. The results show that the 
proportion of females in the applicants’ pool falls with the share of compensation that 
depends on relative performance. This pattern is not driven by men preferring competitive 
environments and women not; rather men avoid competitive environments less than women. 
Important factors are found to explain or attenuate gender differences, including team work, 
whether the task is female-oriented, and local labor market conditions. While Flory et al. 
(2010) study gender differences in job entry, Lavy (2013) focuses on differences in 
performance. In his field set-up, male and female teachers participate in a rank tournament 
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based on the test performance of their classes, and his results reveal no gender differences in 
performance under competition. Finally, using evidence from a UK workplace survey, 
Manning and Saidi (2010) find the effect of performance pay on earnings is generally modest, 
and does not differ markedly by gender. 
Evidence on other types of preferences, such as bargaining and social preferences, has 
been mostly descriptive (see, for example, Babcock and Laschever, 2003), with the exception 
of a recent field study. Leibbrandt and List (2012) use a similar experimental setting as Flory 
et al. (2010) to randomize interested job seekers into two types of job ads, one in which it is 
explicitly stated that the salary is negotiable, and one in which no information on wage 
setting is given. They find that men, unlike women, prefer job environments where no rule of 
wage setting is stated. In this case, men are also more likely than women to initiate wage 
negotiations. By contrast, when it is stated that the salary is negotiable, women are more 
likely to negotiate. The nonexperimental evidence on this topic typically uses predetermined 
measures of attitudes to predict earnings gaps. Fortin (2008) uses longitudinal data to 
investigate the role of greed and altruism, and concludes that differences in these preferences 
– as recorded prior to labor market entry – are a modest but significant important predictor of 
earnings gaps. Manning and Swaffield (2008) use similar information on a comprehensive set 
of preferences (risk attitudes, attitudes towards competition, self-esteem and overconfidence, 
and other-regarding preferences), and show that these can explain around one fifth of the 
earnings gap.  
 
4. Group Preferences and Dynamics 
A natural progression from the study of individual preferences has been to understand their 
role in group settings. If different psychological traits lead men and women to make different 
choices in similar contexts, the gender composition of teams becomes a relevant factor in 
collective decision-  making. Moreover, various studies have shown that individual behavior 
changes in the presence of people from the same or opposite sex (Gneezy and Rustichini, 
2004; Antonovic et al., 2009; Ivanova-Stenzel and Kuebler, 2011), highlighting the role of 
group interactions.  
Economists have shown growing interest in the consequences of gender diversity of 
teams. Higher female participation to the labor market has implied changing workplace 
demographics and more gender-diverse teams. In high-profile professions, such as politics or 
the corporate sector, these changes have been eased by the introduction of explicit gender 
quotas in a number of countries. With growing representation of women on political 
committees, company boards and other group settings, understanding the effects of gender 
diversity is important from an academic, as well as a policy, point of view. Changes in team 
composition may in general have consequences for corporate and political outcomes. 
Moreover, higher female representation in leadership roles may accelerate gender equality 
both in the short run, by attracting high-ability women to such roles, and in the long run, by 
exposing society to female leadership and accelerating changes in social norms (see for 
example Beaman et al., 2009).  
Despite a large body of lab evidence on individual preferences, the experimental literature 
on gender and preferences at the team level is relatively scarce. One of the main problems 
with studying gender and groups is that groups are typically formed in an endogenous way. 
14 
 
 
 
While experiments can go some way to solve this issue through random assignment into 
groups, they tend to create an artificial environment, in which it becomes difficult to 
distinguish group diversity and group dynamics. The ideal setting is one that captures the 
complexity of endogenous group formation, while allowing the researcher to observe 
exogenous changes in group composition and identify the causal relationship between group 
diversity and outcomes.  
Recent reforms that mandate certain levels of female representation on boards of directors 
offer a valuable, quasi-experimental setting to study gender composition of teams and 
performance. One of the first countries to implement gender quota laws was Norway in 2003, 
followed by Spain, Finland, Iceland and France. To study the causal impact of female 
presence on boards on firm performance, Ahern and Dittmer (2012) exploit the gender quota 
reform in Norway, which requires listed companies to achieve 40 percent female board 
representation within two years. The passage of the law change required that approximately 
30 percent of the members of an average board needed to change to be in compliance with 
the 40-percent quota. However, some firms had a greater proportion of female directors 
before the quota was imposed and, therefore, faced a smaller constraint than those with fewer 
women. Given variation in the share of female directors at baseline, the Norwegian setting 
offers a natural experiment for the study of the impact of gender quotas. Ahern and Dittmer 
(2012) document important effects of female board representation. In particular, they find 
that the constraints imposed by the quota implied a decline in stock prices and operating 
profits. 
Understanding the channels through which group composition affects performance is 
clearly important to design appropriate policy intervention. As for overall gender inequalities, 
such channels broadly boil down to gender differences in human capital and preferences. 
Ahern and Dittmer (2012) find that the quota setting in Norway led to less experienced 
boards, as new female directors had substantially less CEO experience and were younger than 
existing male directors. However, other channels such as gender differences in preferences or 
group strategic interactions may not be a priori discarded in Ahern and Dittmer’s study. 
Matsa and Miller (2013) explicitly study the effects of the Norwegian gender quota on 
corporate decision-making and conclude that the quota has changed the style of corporate 
leadership. They compare publicly-listed firms in Norway with a matched sample of unlisted 
firms in Norway, and listed and unlisted firms in other Nordic countries, and find that most 
corporate decisions were unaffected after women’s board representation increased, but note 
sizeable differences in firms’ employment policies. In particular, firms affected by the quota 
undertook fewer employee layoffs, causing an increase in relative labor costs. The results 
suggest that female directors consider labor hoarding a more profitable long-run strategy, or 
that they have a greater concern for workers’ vulnerability to unemployment risk. As the 
gender quota did not lead to less profitable decisions overall, but only changes in human 
resource management, Matsa and Miller conclude that changes in corporate strategy may not 
be explained by less experienced boards. 
Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) provide further quasi-experimental evidence on the 
relevance of gender in teams, by exploiting the random allocation of applicants to selection 
committees in the Spanish civil service. They analyze the chances of success of male and 
female candidates to the Spanish judiciary system and find that female candidates are less 
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likely to be hired whenever they are randomly assigned to a committee with a stronger female 
presence. Further evidence suggests two potential driving mechanisms. First, female 
evaluators tend to overestimate the quality of male candidates. Second, the presence of 
women on committees induces male members to increasingly favor male candidates.  
Recent papers that use field data have also found evidence that the gender composition of 
a team does influence performance. Apesteguia, Azmat, and Iriberri (2010, 2012) use a large 
online business game to study how a female presence on a team affects collective choices and 
performance. The game is played by teams of three, which take the role of a general manager 
of a beauty-industry company, competing in a market composed of four other simulated 
companies. The analysis shows that teams composed of three women are significantly 
outperformed by any other gender combination. Differences in performance are explained by 
differences in decision-making: all-women teams are less aggressive in their pricing 
strategies, invest less in R&D, and invest more in social sustainability initiatives, than any 
other gender combination. Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, and van Praag (2013) use a similar 
business game setting with Dutch university students, in which students are exogenously 
allocated to teams, and detect an inverse u-shaped relationship between the share of women 
and a team’s business performance, such that teams with an equal gender mix perform best. 
Delfgaauw et al. (2013) provide novel field evidence on gender interactions and firm 
performance. They run an experiment in a Dutch retail chain to study whether firm 
performance under competition is affected by the gender of the manager and/or by the gender 
composition of employees. The experiment introduces short-term sales competition in a 
random subset of stores, and tournament compensation is offered within sets of treated stores. 
On average, the introduction of the tournament increases sales growth by five percentage 
points, and this effect is independent of the manager’s gender or the share of female 
employees. However, the effect of the tournament on sales growth is highest in stores in 
which the manager and a sufficiently high fraction of employees are of the same gender.  
The interaction between gender composition and the altruistic behavior of groups is 
analyzed in a dictator’s game setting by Dufwenberg and Muren (2006). In their game, 
groups of three people with varying female presence divide a sum of money among 
themselves and a fourth person. The authors find that female-majority groups give more to 
the individual recipients and choose the egalitarian division more often than male-majority 
groups do. They also find that the most generous groups are those with two women and one 
man, suggesting that the presence of a man in the group triggers an enhanced generosity in 
the group.  
Selection into environments that might be deemed as competitive has been studied at both 
the individual and group level. Following the work of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), a 
number of recent papers have studied entry into incentive schemes in which there exist 
options for group incentive compensation. Wozniak et al. (2010) find that men are more 
likely to choose to enter a tournament and that women are more likely than men to choose 
team pay (though this effect is not statistically significant). Kuhn and Villeval (2012) use a 
real-effort lab experiment in which participants can choose to work under an individual piece 
rate or under a group piece rate in which reward depends on the team’s performance. They 
find that women are significantly more likely than men to select team-based compensation 
and suggest that the same confidence deficit that pushes women out of competition pulls 
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them into teams. Interestingly, however, men become much more likely to join teams—and 
the gender gap vanishes—when an efficiency advantage to team production is introduced. 
While the quota reforms and other field and lab experiments offer valuable insight into 
the consequences of gender diversity, the literature on this issue is still very limited, not least 
because it is restricted to a small and select group of women. Gender corporate board quota 
policies, as well as business games among MBA students, focus attention on women who 
may not be fully representative of the female workforce. The representation of women in 
decision-making at lower levels of responsibility can thus help to form a broader picture of 
the impact of gender diversity and attenuate the stark selection of women at the top.   
 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Experiments offer a novel and useful methodology that is being used widely in almost all 
areas of economics.  In gender economics, the experimental approach offers a way to answer 
questions previously believed to be unanswerable because of data limitations, as well as new 
techniques to cleanly identify mechanisms and results in older topics traditionally studied by 
labor economists. In this paper we have focused on how experiments help shed light on 
gender discrimination, as well as on how they have helped our understanding of gender 
differences in preferences, whether at the individual level or in group settings.  
Despite recent advances, several important aspects of gender differences in labor 
market success have to date not been explored, or have only been partially explored, 
experimentally, and we believe that there exists clear scope for further research in several 
directions. 
First, while experimental evidence can identify discrimination in hiring, disentangling 
different types of discrimination has proved to be challenging. Moreover, to date experiments 
have offered little insight into on-the-job discrimination, and on how anticipated 
discrimination might feed back into individuals’ choices.  
Second, the psychology and behavioral economics studies on gender preferences and 
attitudes have helped shed light on gender disparities in choice. While one may conjecture 
that disparities observed in the lab have implications for labor market outcomes, more direct 
evidence from the workplace is needed to draw useful conclusions for gender gaps in real 
markets. 
Finally, it is not entirely understood how preferences are formed and, importantly, 
whether there is scope for policy to change them. For example, gender differences in labor 
market outcomes are typically mirrored by symmetric gender differences in household roles, 
leading to the natural question of whether household roles reflect gender preferences and 
whether, either through nature or nurture, they may shape labor market choices, constraints, 
and performance. While an established literature, mostly theoretical or non-experimental, 
studies efficient household bargaining and gender time allocation, further causal evidence is 
needed to understand the remaining issues on gender inequalities in the household and the 
labor market. 
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